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Abstract
The economic, political and institutional ties between Latin America and China have 
become closer as the Chinese economy has grown. Indeed, as a result of its rapid 
economic growth, China now plays a systemic role in the world economy. However, since 
the global financial crisis, the Chinese economic model has shown signs of exhaustion 
and controlling the rate of growth may prove to be a particularly difficult challenge, taking 
into account the profound structural transformation to be addressed and the high level of 
debt of the Chinese economy. Against this backdrop, the article provides an empirical 
analysis of the effects on the Latin American countries’ growth of their trade and 
investment relations with China. It also analyses the channels through which the Chinese 
economic slowdown is transmitted to the region. The study shows that, through the trade 
channel at least, an unexpected slowdown in China could have a negative impact on 
economic growth in Latin America.
Keywords: China, Latin America, economic growth, international trade, foreign direct 
investment.
JEL codes: O11, O47, O54.
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Since the 1980s, China has recorded average annual GDP growth of close to 10%, focused 
on investment and exports (see Chart 1) (Dieppe et al., 2018). Thanks to this rapid growth 
it is now the world’s second largest economy by GDP. In addition, thanks to its growing 
interconnectedness with other economies, it has become a systemic economy. Latin 
America is no exception in this process and its ties with China – which are not only 
economic but also political and institutional – have become closer.
However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese economic model has begun to 
show signs of a certain degree of exhaustion: the contribution of the drivers of its high 
economic growth (investment and net exports) has fallen and private sector (mainly 
corporate) debt has risen significantly (Timini, 2017). Thus, after recording year-on-year 
growth rates of around 6.7% in the two previous years, Chinese GDP grew by 6.4% in 
2018  Q4 (6.6% in annual average terms), amidst fears that the slowdown will extend 
beyond 2019. The growth rate in 2018 was the lowest figure recorded since the global 
financial crisis, partly as a result of the tightened financial regulations, aimed at curbing the 
exponential growth of shadow banking activity1 and of local governments’ off-balance-
sheet financial instruments (Bai et al., 2016). The authorities responded to the slowdown 
by introducing monetary and fiscal stimulus measures and easing financial conditions 
(IMF, 2019), but controlling the rate of growth may prove to be a particularly difficult 
challenge, taking into account the profound structural transformation that the Chinese 
economic model will have to undergo and the high level of debt of the Chinese economy.
In this setting, the article analyses the main channels through which a potential economic 
slowdown in China may be transmitted to the Latin American economies.  
This section analyses the (direct and indirect) economic effects of trade between China 
and Latin America and of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) on the region’s economies 
(Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). It does not cover another important channel of economic 
interconnectedness, i.e. the financial channel and the impact of potential changes in 
financial conditions stemming from economic developments in China (Cashin et al., 2017).2
The direct effects of trade refer to the impact of trade flows (exports and imports) between 
the two areas on activity in the countries of Latin America. Since China joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Latin American exports to China have risen from 1.5% of the 
total in 2001 to 10% in 2017. Imports to Latin America from China have also risen quickly, 
to 18% of the total in 2017 (compared with 3% in 2001) (see Chart 2). However, these 
aggregate figures do not reflect the imbalance in terms of value added and technology 
content: Latin American imports from China have higher value added and higher technology 
content than Latin American exports, which are primarily commodities (ILO, 2017). In 
addition, there is a high level of heterogeneity between countries in terms of the economic 
Introduction
Transmission channels
1  Shadow banking is defined as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or partly) outside of the 
regular banking system” (FSB, 2017).
2  For an analysis of the importance of the financial channel for emerging market economies in the event of a 
slowdown in China, see Roth et al. (2019).
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weight of exports to China and the products exported (see Chart 5). In any event, such a 
significant increase in exports is expected to have had a positive impact on economic 
growth in the region.
The direct effects of imports may be less clear. On the one hand, to the extent that Chinese 
imports crowd out domestic markets’ local production, they could adversely affect 
employment and consumption. On the other, to the extent that the increase in Chinese 
imports is to the detriment of imports from other countries, rather than of local production, 
it may introduce more competitive products onto the market and boost consumption. 
Jenkins and Dussel Peters (2009) suggest that such effects are observed in most sectors 
of the Argentine and Brazilian economies. Moreover, if imports are used as inputs in the 
production process, they can increase firms’ productivity and reduce the sale prices of 
final goods (Amiti and Konings (2007) and Choquette and Meinen (2015)).
SOURCE: CEIC.
Growth in China has been based on investment and exports and has held at 10% per annum on average since the 1980s. However, since the global 
financial crisis, the Chinese economic model has shown signs of exhaustion.
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Since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), Latin American exports to China and imports from China have grown.
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There are also several indirect channels that reflect the impact of China on Latin American 
growth through trade. The first is competition in third markets (Jenkins et al., 2008): China 
is a competitor for some Latin American countries, especially for those specialising in 
manufacturing and exports of goods, where China has a competitive advantage.3 Several 
empirical studies suggest that this is particularly the case for Mexico. The second indirect 
channel is the growing interconnectedness between China and Latin America’s trading 
partners, such as the United States and the European Union, whose economies are 
increasingly exposed to economic activity in China. If an economic slowdown in China 
were to spread to these advanced economies, which are some of Latin America’s biggest 
export markets, activity in the region could be affected. Lastly, the third channel is related 
to the sheer size of the Chinese economy, which means that China plays a central role in 
the global price fluctuations of the products – especially commodities – that it imports 
(Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2013) (see Chart 3). In turn, these imports form a key part of Latin 
American exports, thus affecting their terms of trade (Lehmann et al. (2007) and Jenkins 
(2011)).
In addition, over the last two decades, China has become not only a top FDI destination 
but also the source of FDI to other countries (ECLAC, 2013). China’s FDI flows to Latin 
America have grown significantly, up to an annual average of $17.6 billion in the period 
2016-18 (compared with an annual average of $1.6  billion in the period 2005-07) (see 
Chart  4). Chinese FDI was traditionally concentrated on the extractive industries;4 this 
could explain, at least in part, the slowdown in FDI observed in 2013-15, coinciding with 
the end of the commodity price boom (copper, gold and oil), and its concentration in 
certain countries (especially Brazil, Peru and Chile). Since 2017, several Latin American 
countries have entered into cooperation agreements with China,5 under the Belt and Road 
SOURCE: World Bank.
Latin American terms of trade are exposed to fluctuations in international commodity prices. These depend on Chinese demand, given the composition 
of Chinese imports and the size of the Chinese economy.
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3  At the turn of the century, China specialised strictly in exports of highly labour-intensive products. But there is 
evidence of a shift in Chinese exports towards higher quality and more capital-intensive products (Pula and 
Santabárbara (2011) and Caporale et al. (2015)).
4  In recent years, Chinese FDI has increasingly focused on service sector activity (Avendano et al., 2017).
5  Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Chile, Grenada, Guyana, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago. Ecuador has signed a 
“cooperative document” (for more information see https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/memorundum-of-
understanding-belt-and-road-initiative/).
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Initiative, that could lead to a reorientation of FDI towards infrastructures in Latin America. 
In any event, the literature associates FDI with increased productivity, technology transfer 
and trade in the firms and sectors where it is implemented, which would drive up growth 
in the region overall.
From a different standpoint, part of the FDI flows to Latin America from other regions of the 
world could be indirectly diverted to China through the “competition effect” generated by 
that country’s strong economic growth. However, the impact of possible competition from 
China on FDI flows to Latin America would be marginal (García-Herrero and Santabárbara 
(2007), Chantasasawat et al. (2010) and Yao and Wang (2014)) and seems only to affect 
certain very specific geographical areas (such as the rest of Asia).
In line with the economic growth literature, the analysis in this section aims to quantify the 
direct effects of Chinese trade and FDI on growth in the countries of Latin America.6 The 
technical details of the estimates, which cover 16 countries for the period 2001-2015, are 
set out in Box  1. The findings are in general in keeping with the literature: population 
growth has a negative effect on GDP per capita (e.g. Busse et al., 2016). The relationship 
between investment and growth is positive, but – contrary to what may be expected –  it is 
not significant. The terms of trade of the Latin American economies have a positive 
correlation with growth, which suggests that Latin American exporters benefit from higher 
commodity prices (Kataryniuk and Martínez-Martín, 2018), which in turn are explained (at 
least in part) by higher demand from China.7 The initial level of GDP per capita has a 
negative impact; this confirms the convergence effect identified in most empirical studies 
of economic growth (at country level, e.g. Hansen and Tarp, 2001).
The Latin American countries’ trade ties with China also have a clear positive impact on 
growth. First because higher external demand for goods stimulates domestic economic 
activity, and second because higher imports from China may entail cheaper inputs, boosting 
Estimates and discussion
SOURCES: Global Investment Tracker and World Bank.
Chinese FDI flows to Latin America have also risen continuously since the turn of the century, but they are concentrated in certain countries and sectors 
(the extractive industries).
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6  The sample includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela.
7  This finding is affected by the number of explanatory variables included in the regression.
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firms’ productivity and lowering prices. The effect of exports is robust to the inclusion of 
FDI, in line with the findings of Vianna (2016) and García-Herrero et al. (2013). This is 
evidence of the role that Latin American exports to China play in the economic growth of 
these countries, especially since the year 2000 which is the period on which the analysis 
focuses.
FDI flows from China have no impact on economic growth. There may be various reasons 
for this, including the concentration of investment on the extractive industries which 
according to the literature has a lower or zero impact on economic growth compared with 
FDI in manufacturing (see, for example, Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) and Wang 
(2009)), and also institutional quality (Shan et al., 2018). When trade with and FDI flows 
from the rest of the world variables are included, as a robustness test, they are not 
significant, in line with the findings of other authors using a similar methodology (Busse et 
al. (2016) and Ulasan (2015)).
The findings are subject to certain limitations. The empirical study does not include all the 
theoretical channels mentioned above, given the constraints imposed by the methodology 
used. Some of these channels, such as the risk of excessive concentration of exports in 
some sectors (commodities), which some authors argue is a direct consequence of 
Chinese influence, or strong Chinese competition in third markets (especially the United 
States) (UNCTAD, 2019), could have negative effects for growth in the medium to long 
term. In addition, it is important to note that the estimates represent the average impact, 
and that there is a certain degree of heterogeneity in the level of the different Latin American 
countries’ exposure to China through the trade channel. Indeed, although certain common 
patterns can be observed, exposure in terms of exports to China as a proportion of total 
exports or GDP varies enormously, as does the breakdown by sector of the products 
exported (see Chart 5).
A further caveat is that the data used relate to gross exports to China. Gross exports include 
SOURCES: Datastream and Observatory of Economic Complexity.
The importance of exports to China varies significantly across countries, as does the type of product exported, although they are mostly primary 
sector products.
 % OF TOTAL EXPORTS  % OF GDP (right-hand scale)
1  EXPORTS TO CHINA, 2017
CHART 5
Soya
Soya
Frozen
meat
Iron
Iron
Crude oil
Crude oil
Crude oil
Crude oil
Copper ore
Copper
ore
Copper ore
Refined copper
Refined
copper
Unwrought 
copper
Ferrous alloys Copper 
scrap
Integrated 
circuits Telephones
Animal fodder
Refined 
oil
0 20 40 60 80 100
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Venezuela
2  TOP 3 EXPORTS TO CHINA, 2017, % OF TOTAL
$ bn
LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS TO CHINA
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
A
rg
en
tin
a
B
ol
iv
ia
B
ra
zi
l
C
hi
le
C
ol
om
b
ia
C
os
ta
 R
ic
a
E
cu
ad
or
H
on
du
ra
s
M
ex
ic
o
N
ic
ar
ag
ua
P
an
am
a
P
ar
ag
ua
y
P
er
u
E
l S
al
va
do
r
U
ru
gu
ay
V
en
ez
ue
la
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 6 ECONOMIC BULLETIN THE IMPACT OF CHINA ON LATIN AMERICA: TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CHANNELS
goods produced with no generation of value added in Latin America and goods not destined 
to meet final demand in China. Accordingly, the data may overestimate the actual effect of 
the trade channel. This is illustrated in Chart  6 which depicts, for 2011,8 the difference 
between the share of gross exports to China and the share of value added produced in the 
countries of Latin America and destined to meet final demand in China. Lastly, the 
interconnectedness between the countries of Latin America, albeit limited in some cases, 
could reinforce the contagion effects: slowdown in one Latin American economy as a result 
of slowdown in China could reduce its imports from other countries in the region.
The article analyses some of the channels of transmission from the Chinese economy to 
the Latin American economies. The empirical estimates made suggest that trade exposure 
to China is significant for Latin American growth, over and above the effect that China has 
on commodity prices, and that Latin American exports to China have had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the GDP per capita growth rate. The analysis shows that 
an unexpected slowdown in China could have a negative effect on the economies of the 
region, at least through the trade channel.
In addition, a dramatic shift in commodity prices (whether mining or agricultural products) that 
often move in line with economic activity in China, may have a significant impact on the group 
of Latin American countries that have most exposure to commodity production. Lastly, FDI 
flows from China appear to have no direct significant impact on growth in the region.
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One of the methodologies generally used to estimate growth 
determinants consists in applying the Solow growth model, using 
population growth, the saving rate and technological change as 
explanatory variables. In the model used here, in accordance with 
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995), the real GDP per capita 
growth rate in Latin America is determined by the following 
expression: 
 ititit1–it10it ’X’Z    [1]
where Dgit–1 is the dependent lagged variable, Z’it is a vector that 
includes standard control variables in accordance with the 
literature – population growth (DPOPit), investment growth (DINVit, 
as a proxy of the saving rate), a terms of trade index (ToTit) and the 
level of initial GDP per capita (yi, initial) – to ascertain if there is (beta) 
convergence (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1996)) between the different economies. X’it is a vector that 
includes the variables of interest. In accordance with Vianna 
(2016), imports from and exports to China, and imports from and 
exports to the rest of the world, are included in alternative 
specifications (given their high correlation). Lastly, FDI flows from 
China and the rest of the world are also included, as it is expected 
that FDI will be associated with the creation of jobs that command 
higher wages and with higher productivity (Borin and Mancini, 
2016), knowledge spillover (Perri and Peruffo, 2016) and greater 
trade (Liu et al., 2001). 
The problems of endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables, 
and the possible biases arising from inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable, are addressed using the System Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) with heteroscedastic weight matrix, 
which is particularly suitable for small and highly persistent 
samples (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Roodman (2009)).1 Table 1 
shows the signs expected and the results of the regressions.
BOX 1METHODOLOGY USED IN THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
1  The Two-Step System GMM. One of the main risks with estimators of 
this kind is the proliferation of instruments in the estimation (as several 
instruments are used for each of the variables considered endogenous). 
Following the golden rule in the case of a sample with only a small 
number of observations, we ensured that the number of instruments was 
always equal to or less than the number of groups (in this case, 
countries). The data for the GDP, investment, population growth, terms 
of trade and GDP per capita variables are World Bank data (https:// data.
worldbank.org/); the trade and FDI data are UN data (COMTRADE and 
UNCTAD).
SOURCE: Own calculations.
NOTE: The sample includes 16 countries, from 2001 to 2015. To eliminate the economic cycle effect and in keeping with the literature (e.g. Busse et al., 2016), the 
5-year average (with no overlapping) has been calculated for all the variables. To determine the expected sign of each of the variables, data have been compiled 
from a range of different studies or theoretical approaches. The “?” sign is used where there are groups of studies or theoretical approaches that lead to contrasting 
results for a specific variable. All regressors have been included in the equation as logarithms of the respective variable as a percentage of GDP, with the exception 
of the initial level of GDP per capita. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Expected sign
Main 
determinants (1)
Main 
determinants (2)
Trade
(China)
Trade and FDI 
(China) 
Trade 
(RoW)
Trade and FDI 
(RoW)
Δyit-1 – –** –** –** –*** + –
ΔINVit + + + + +** + +***
ΔPOPit – –** –* –** –** –** –***
ToTit + +* + + +** + +
*––*–**–––laitini ,iy
***+***++NHC_pxE
+***+?NHC_pmI
IED_CHN ? –
Exp_RdM + + +
Imp_RdM ? + –
IED_RdM + –
Table 1
EFFECTS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT ON LAC GROWTH
